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Daubert, Doctors and Differential Diagnosis:
Treating Medical Causation Testimony as Evidence
An assessment of admissibility is not the same as an assessment
of sufficiency, but Daubert has created that confusion
By Michael B. Kent Jr.
CAROL HELLER began experiencing
various respiratory problems shortly after
Shaw Industries installed new carpeting in
her house.' A few months later, she consulted an allergist, Dr. Joseph Papano. He
took her medical and family histories,
questioned her about the house's environment, ordered chest x-rays, and performed
several laboratory tests. Based on his findings from the collected data, Dr. Papano
ruled out various possible causes of
Heller's respiratory problems. This winnowing process, known as "differential diagnosis" in the medical community,
coupled with the close temporal relationship between Heller's symptoms and the
installation of the new carpet, led Dr.
Papano to conclude that the carpet was the
cause of her illness.
Heller sued Shaw Industries for, among
other things, failure to warn and defective
design. She called Dr. Papano as an expert
witness to testify on the issue of causation, but the trial court excluded his testimony. The problem: Although Dr. Papano
conducted a differential diagnosis to determine what did not cause Heller's symptoms, he could point to no studies indicating that the carpet could cause them.
Without this testimony, Heller could not
prove causation, and the court granted
summary judgment in favor of Shaw.
1. Heller v. Shaw Indus. Inc., 167 F.3d 146 (3d
Cir. 1999).
2. Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Labs. Inc., 874
F.Supp. 1441, 1448 (D. V.I. 1994). See also Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th
Cir. 1988) (discussing general and specific causation in mass tort class action litigation).

Michael B. Kent Jr. is a 1999 graduate
of the University of Georgia Law School,
having obtained his B.A. degree from the
University of Alabama in 1995. Since
writing this article, he has taken a position as law clerk for Judge J. Owen
Forrester of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern Districtof Georgia.
This is an edited and condensed
version of the paper with which he won
second place in the 1999 IADC Legal
Writing Contest.

The Third Circuit, while disagreeing with
some of the trial court's rationale, affirmed
both the exclusion of Dr. Papano's testimony and summary disposition in favor of
Shaw.
THE PROBLEM
The Heller case reveals one of the central problems underlying most mass and
toxic tort litigation-proving that the
defendant's product caused the plaintiff's
injury. As is the case with other torts, the
plaintiff in a mass or toxic tort case must
show duty, negligence, causation and damage. In the mass or toxic tort context, however, the element of causation often plays a
dispositive role. Plaintiffs must prove both
that the product is capable of producing
the injuries (general causation) and that the
product actually did so (specific causation). 2 To do so, they must rely on the testimony of experts-toxicologists, engineers, physicians-with scientific and
technical knowledge of the product in
question and its effects on the human
body. If the testimony of these experts is
either inadmissible or insufficient to carry
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the burden of proof, plaintiffs' cases cannot go forward. Accordingly, the admissibility and sufficiency of the expert testimony often becomes a hotly contested
issue.
Inherent in ruling on the admissibility of
expert testimony is that courts must review
the underlying science to determine the reliability and relevance of the evidence. For
70 years, the "general acceptance" test
from Frye v. United States3 enjoyed almost
uniform application in both state and federal courts.4 This test admitted scientific
evidence if, and only if, it was generally
accepted in the pertinent scientific community. Under Frye, courts looked deferentially to scientists in determining whether
the proffered evidence met the standards of
scientific reliability.
This era of deference came to an end
with the Supreme Court's decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
Inc.,5 which interpreted Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 as superseding the common
law "general acceptance" test. The Court
read Rule 702 as establishing a system
wherein federal trial judges ensure the reliability, as well as the relevance, of scientific testimony.
Trial judges must serve as "gatekeepers"
when it comes to scientific evidence, assessing the methodologies underlying the
testimony of expert witnesses. Trial judges
must review and screen evidence based on
everything from aerodynamics to epidemiology. The "gatekeeper" role was reaffirmed in General Electric Co. v. Joiner6
and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.7

3. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
4. See CHRISTOPER B. MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE

LAIRD C.

§ 7.8, at 744 (1995).

5. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
6. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
7. 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999), rev'g 131 F.3d 1433
(11th Cir. 1997). For district court decision, see
Carmichael v. Samyang Tires Inc., 923 F.Supp.
1514 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
8. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 389 (5th
ed. 1982).
9. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35
F.3d 717, 758 (3d Cir. 1994) (recognizing differen-

A source of scientific evidence in mass
and toxic tort litigation is the medical technique called differential diagnosis. It is a
clinical procedure whereby medical doctors determine which of several potential
diseases is causing the patient's symptoms
by ruling out possible causes until only
one or two remain.'
Several courts have recognized the significance of this procedure to the causation
issue.9 The problem thus turns on the reliability and fit of using the technique to determine cause in the legal, rather than the
clinical, sense. Although the cases have
fleshed out many of the questions concerning the use of differential diagnosis as evidence of causation, the answers to these
questions remain somewhat vague because
courts often confuse general and specific
causation, as well as admissibility and sufficiency. A clear treatment of the issue is
needed.
DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS
Differential diagnosis, as used in the
medical profession, is a clinical process
whereby doctors determine from what disease a patient suffers. By comparing the
patient's symptoms to symptoms associated with known diseases, the physician attempts to identify the disease or diseases
that best explain the facts of the patient's
case. 0 Identification takes place through a
process of elimination, 1 with the physician
collecting data on the patient's history and
illness, analyzing that data and ruling out
various diseases until a final diagnosis is
reached. In short, differential diagnosis is

tial diagnosis as technique that involves assessing
causation with respect to particular individual);
Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F.Supp. 756, 771 (E.D.
Va. 1995) (acknowledging importance of differential diagnosis to question of specific causation),
aff'd in relevant part, 100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir.
1996).
10. Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F.Supp.
12, 21 n.41 (D. Mass. 1995). See also A. MCGEHEE
HARVEY & JAMES BORDLEY II1, DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS 7 (2d ed. 1970).
11. In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp.2d
1217, 1229 (D. Colo. 1998).
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the act of distinguishing one disease2 from stances, such as chemical compounds, to
which the patient has been exposed. For
another to select a proper treatment.
It thus aids a physician in determining treatment purposes, one or more of these
the injury from which a person suffers, but substances is presumed to be the cause of
the technique also is presented as evidence the patient's disease. 7
Therefore, differential diagnosis often
of causation at trial. This has drawn criticism from courts and commentators consists of a clinical determination, by
alike. 3 This criticism often is justified be- process of elimination, of both the disease
cause, while physicians speak in terms of causing the patient's symptoms and the
"cause," they generally focus their differ- most likely etiologic agent causing that
ential diagnosis
on defining the patient's disease. The problem arises from extrapo4
illness. '
lating from this determination of clinical
causation,
for treatment purposes, to cauOn the other hand, a thorough diagnosis
frequently considers the underlying causal sation in the legal sense.
Because physicians utilize differential
agents of a disease in prescribing a treat5
ment. Indeed, some courts describe the diagnosis in a clinical setting, some lawtechnique of differential diagnosis as "dif- yers contend that it does not constitute sciferential etiology," a term that heavily ence. 8 Medical writers, however, indicate
stresses the causation issue since etiology the contrary, noting that a physician should
is the science and study of the causes of perform a differential diagnosis in the
disease. 16
same manner as other scientific researchWhen physicians seek to determine the objectively collecting all the facts, analyzdisease causing the symptoms-for ex- ing them in an unprejudiced fashion and
ample, lung cancer-they often look for ending with a logical conclusion. 19
Certainly, the steps in conducting a
and rule out known etiologic agents of the
disease-for example, asbestos. The most proper differential diagnosis resemble the
likely agent remaining after this sifting is scientific method, and differential diagnoconsidered the cause of the disease. If no sis remains scientific in nature although
known etiologic agents remain on the list, performed in a clinical environment. Acattention is focused on any suspicious sub- cordingly, the Supreme Court's decision in

12. See Stuart F. Spicker, Ethics in Diagnosis:
Bodily Integrity, Truth-telling, and the Good Physician, in THE ETHICS OF DIAGNOSIS 107, 108 (Jos6

Luis Peset & Diego Garcia eds., 1992) (identifying
treatment as final step in process of clinical reasoning).
13. See, e.g., Lofgren v. Motorola, 1998 WL
299915, at *24 (Ariz. Super. Ct. June 1, 1998)
(finding, under Frye standard, that differential diagnosis is "unequivocally rejected by the scientific
community" as means of determining causation);
Bruce R. Parker, Understanding Epidemiology and
Its Use in Drug and Medical Device Litigation, 65
DEF. COUNS. J. 35, 57 (1998) (stating that differential diagnosis does not generally require doctor to
form conclusions regarding causal agents).
14. See, e.g., ROBERT H. SELLER, DIFFERENTIAL
DIAGNOSIS OF COMMON COMPLAINTS 294-97 (3d
ed. 1996) (listing "causes" of shortness of breath as,
inter alia, asthma, emphysema, chronic bronchitis,
and congestive heart failure).
15.

MYRON R. SCHOENFELD, STRICTLY CONFI-

DENTIAL: How

(1990).

DOCTORS MAKE DECISIONS 65

16. See, e.g., McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61

F.3d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir. 1995).
17. Not all physicians agree on the soundness of
presuming causation. See, e.g., Barrow v. BristolMyers Squibb Co., 1998 WL 812318 at *23 n.221
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 1998) ("Dr. Kotzin was critical
of those who contend that silicone gel breast implants are a cause of symptoms because they cannot
explain such symptoms using differential diagnosis.").
18. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11-12,
Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269 (5th
Cir. 1998) (en banc), filed in the U.S. Supreme
Court January 5, 1999 (No. 98-992) (arguing that
Daubert should not apply to clinical medical causation testimony because it is based on technical skill
and experience rather than scientific knowledge).
The Supreme Court's decision in Kumho Tire (footnote 7) may have rendered this argument moot because the Court held that Daubert's gatekeeper obligation applies not only to expert testimony based
on science, but to all expert testimony.
19. HARVEY & BORDLEY, supra note 10, at 3.
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the rule requires that the scientific evidence assist the trier of fact. To be admissible, the evidence must "fit" the factual
DAUBERT AND JOINER
dispute. "Fit" is not always obvious, the
Court explained, as scientific validity for
A. Daubert
Daubert is the seminal case regarding one purpose does not necessarily constitute
scientific validity for another. But there
the admissibility of scientific expert testimust be a scientific connection between
mony. The new system it instituted for
the testimony and the pertinent inquiry.
testing the admissibility of scientific eviTo help the trial courts determine
dence has resulted in confusion among
whether
evidence constitutes scientific
2
°
commentators and the lower courts.
knowledge
that will assist the trier of fact,
The Court held that Rule 702 of the Fedthe
Court
articulated
the following noneral Rules of Evidence supersedes the
exhaustive
list
of
factors:
(1) whether the
common law Frye test of general acceptheory
or
technique
can
be
and has been
tance in the relevant scientific field. The
tested;
(2)
whether
it
has
been
subjected to
Court first noted that the Federal Rules
peer
review
and
publication;
(3)
the known
render a broad range of evidence admisor
potential
rate
of
error,
(4)
the
existence
sible and that neither Rule 702 nor its legand
maintenance
of
control
standards;
and
islative history mentions "general accep(5)
whether
the
theory
or
technique
enjoys
tance." The Court concluded that Congress
did not intend the "general acceptance" general acceptance in the relevant scienstandard to be applied as the sole test of tific community. The Court specifically
admonished trial judges to focus on exadmissibility.
Having determined that Frye no longer perts' methodologies, not their concluapplied to litigation in the federal system, sions, when applying these factors.
The Court further reminded the trial
the Court declared that Rule 702 estabjudges
that they must consider a host of
lishes a "gatekeeping" role for the federal
other
evidentiary
rules-for example, Rule
trial courts, obligating the judge to "ensure
403,
which
permits
the exclusion of relthat any and all scientific testimony or evievant
evidence
if
its
probative value is
dence is not only relevant, but reliable."
substantially
outweighed
by the "danger of
As to reliability, the Court noted that
unfair
prejudice,
confusion
of the issue, or
Rule 702 required that an expert's testimisleading
of
the
jury,
or
by considermony be "scientific knowledge," a term
ations
of
undue
delay,
waste
of time, or
that implies a grounding in the procedures
needless
presentation
of
cumulative
eviof science. "Knowledge" implies that the
dence."
The
Court
also
commented
on
the
proposition must constitute more than substrength
of
the
adversary
system,
noting
jective belief or unsupported speculation.
Together, the two terms mean that experts that cross-examination and the introducmust derive their assertions by means of tion of contrary evidence are powerful
tools to combat shaky evidence. Trial
the scientific method.
judges
remain free, the Court advised, to
As to relevancy, the Court also looked
grant
summary
disposition if the evidence
to the language of Rule 702, noting that
is insufficient to support a jury verdict upholding the proffered position.
20. See Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32
Finally, the Court conceded that imporGA. L. REV. 699, 701 (1998). For a concise
overview of the history of Daubert and a broad tant differences exist between the search
discussion of its application in toxic tort cases, see for truth in the laboratory and the search
Christopher H. Buckley Jr. & Charles H. Haake, for truth in the courtroom. The former inSeparating the Scientists Wheat from the
Charlatan's Chaff: Daubert's Role in Toxic Tort volves a perpetual revision where wrong or
Litigation, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,293 (1998).
incomplete answers prove useful to the
Daubert applies to its use as causation evidence in federal trials.
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quest for an ultimate truth, while the latter
involves reaching a quick, final solution
about a given set of facts. Because of these
differences, the Court admitted that judges
inevitably will prevent the jury from hearing about certain innovations that may turn
out to be correct. That event, however, is
the balance struck by the rules, which are
"designed not for the exhaustive search for
cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes."
B. Joiner
Four and a half years after Daubert, the
Court reaffirmed trial judges' gatekeeper
functions in Joiner. The primary issue in
that case was what standard appellate
courts should apply when reviewing district court determinations of admissibility.
The llth Circuit, applying what was described as a "particularly stringent standard of review," reversed the trial court's
decision to exclude the plaintiff's scientific
evidence and grant summary judgment to
the defendant. The Supreme Court in turn
reversed, holding that abuse of discretion
constituted the appropriate standard of review.
Applying that standard, the Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion, but rather was within its discretion in excluding the plaintiffs scientific
expert testimony because the animal and
epidemiological studies on which that testimony was based did not reliably support
the conclusions drawn. Conclusions and
methodology are not entirely distinct from
one another, the Court stated, continuing:
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eral courts analyze the admissibility of scientific expert testimony. The decision itself has raised a myriad of questions concerning the proper performance of the
gatekeeping role, and the Court's subsequent decisions and opinions in Joiner and
Kuhmo Tire only scratch the surface in answering those questions. In large part, the
Court seems to have remained purposefully vague. Despite the confusion and ambiguity, however, a general framework can
be drawn.
First, Daubert strengthens the trial
court's role in assessing scientific evidence. Although Daubert enables district
courts to admit a somewhat broader range
of scientific testimony than was possible
under Frye, trial judges nonetheless possesses wide discretion to sift through experts' attestations. 22 They do not have to
defer to the scientific community when
making admissibility determinations. Instead, they play an active part in vigorously ferreting out expert opinion not23
based on relevant scientific methodology.
Second, trial judges are to analyze reliability at every stage of the expert's decision-making process. The court must consider not only whether each step of the
underlying methodology is reliable, but
also whether the conclusions drawn from
the methodology are reliable. If the methodology is flawed at any step, then the testimony does not meet the standard for admissibility under Rule 702.24 "This is true
whether the step completely changes a reliable methodology or merely misapplies
that methodology. 25

[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal
Rules of Evidence requires a district court to
21. 118 S.Ct. at 519.
admit opinion evidence which is connected
22. See Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d
to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
386 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing trial court's
381,
expert. A court may conclude that there is strengthened
role).
simply too great an analytical gap between
23. Cavallo, 892 F.Supp. at 774.
24. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947
the data and the opinion proffered.2"
C. Putting It All Together
The Court's decision in Daubert ushered in a new regime under which the fed-

F.Supp. 1387, 1401 (D. Or. 1996) (court performing
gatekeeping role must ensure faithful application of
scientific methodology "from initial premise to ultimate conclusion" and not admit evidence based
only on "leap of faith").
25. Paoli, 35 F.3d at 745.
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Third, the trial court must consider the
fit of both the scientific technique and the
conclusion drawn therefrom to the actual
issues in dispute in the case. The final conclusions formed by experts must connect
the science to the issues before the
factfinder. The exact standard for fit remains somewhat elusive, but courts agree
that it is a higher standard than the general
relevancy requirement of Rule 402.26
Here the reliability and relevance analyses overlap. If the underlying methodology
is not reliable, or if the conclusions do not
reliably flow from valid methodology, then
the testimony does not meet Daubert's fit
requirement. As the Court indicated in
Joiner, sometimes "there is simply too
great an analytical gap between the data
and the opinion proffered. '2 7 Therefore,
the standard for fit requires a sound conclusion, based on valid scientific procedures, that clearly affects the resolution of
a contested issue. Consequently, the standard for fit looks more like an analysis of
sufficiency than admissibility.
Finally, trial judges must apply other
provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly Rule 403. Daubert
makes clear that the requirements for admissibility under Rule 702 do not foreclose
the applicability of other rules, particularly
Rule 403.
DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS AND
ADMISSIBILITY
Post-Daubert cases addressing the admissibility of causation testimony based on
differential diagnosis have split into three
basic camps.

26. See Daubert on remand, 43 F.3d 1311, 1321
n.17 (9th Cir. 1995); Paoli, 35 F.3d at 745.
27. 118 S.Ct. at 519.
28. 61 F.3d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995).
29. Pick v. Am. Med. Sys. Inc., 958 F.Supp.
1151, 1162-63 (E.D. La. 1997); Wilson v. Petroleum Wholesale Inc., 904 F.Supp. 1188, 1190 (D.
Colo. 1995).

A. Overview of the Cases
1. "Broad Admissibility" Approach
These decisions share the common characteristic of allowing physicians to testify
as to both levels of causation based exclusively on their use of differential diagnosis. In McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., for
example, the Second Circuit affirmed the
admission of testimony that fumes from
glue caused the plaintiff's throat polyps,
even though the physician could point to
no medical literature identifying glue
fumes as a general causal agent of the injury. 28 The doctor's opinion passed muster
under Daubert because it was based on
differential diagnosis, and the trial court
therefore did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony. Any faults with the
use of this technique as a methodology
went to weight, rather than admissibility.
Federal district courts in Louisiana and
Colorado also have allowed medical expert
testimony on the issue of general causation
derived
solely from differential diagno29
sis.

Because differential diagnosis constitutes the primary clinical tool by which
medical doctors determine the disease
from which a patient suffers, as well as the
possible etiologic agents of that disease,
the "broad admissibility" approach allows
it as evidence of either level of causation.
In short, "broad admissibility" requires
only that the physician employ in the
courtroom the same techniques used when
treating patients in the examination room.
2. "Middle Ground" Approach
These decisions often admit causation
evidence derived from differential diagnosis, but they require that the clinical procedure be coupled with something more. In
Heller, for example, the Third Circuit concluded that Dr. Papano's differential diagnosis evidence satisfied Daubert's reliability prong, even though he relied on no
published studies linking the chemicals in
the carpeting to the type of respiratory
problems from which Heller suffered. The

Treating Medical Causation Testimony as Evidence
court affirmed the exclusion of the testimony, however, because the temporal relationship used by the doctor did not support
a conclusion that the carpet caused the
plaintiffs illness. Heller's symptoms first
appeared several weeks after the installation of the carpet, and they continued after
the carpet was removed.
As Heller demonstrates, the "middle
ground" cases allow differential diagnosis
evidence as long as the physician also relies on some fact or circumstance indicative of general causation. This additional
proof usually takes the form of a close
temporal relationship between the plaintiff's exposure to a supposedly toxic sub30
stance and the onset of illness or injuries.

Alternately, this proof might consist of
generalized allegations, derived from anecdotal evidence but unsupported by any scientific study, that the scientific community
possesses wide knowledge of the presumed causal agent's harmful effects.31
In either situation, the court apparently
views this additional proof as bolstering
the doctor's clinical determination that exposure to the suspected product resulted in
the plaintiff's illness. Such evidence presumably allows the doctor to include the
product in the list of possible etiologic
agents. Put differently, a close temporal
link between exposure and symptom, or an
unsupported but widely circulated belief,
provides a reliable basis for the assumption
that the product is capable of causing the
disease in question. Without such evidence, no reliable basis exists, and the
opinion must be excluded.
Under the "middle ground" approach,

30. See, e.g., Zuchowicz, 140 F.2d at 385 (explaining that expert reached conclusion on causation after considering temporal relationship and
conducting differential etiology).
31. See, e.g.. Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l Inc.,
128 F.3d 802, 809 (3d Cir. 1997) (as amended)
(finding that "widely accepted scientific knowledge
of the harmful nature of organophosphates" bolstered expert's conclusion). In the original opinion
in Kannankeril, the court declared: "It is an acknowledged scientific fact that chlorpyrifos, the active ingredient in Dursban, is harmful to humans
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therefore, medical experts bear some burden to show why they considered the
defendant's product to be a potential cause
in the first place. Some cases suggest a different presumption, however, viewing differential diagnosis as inherently reliable
unless the defendants offer plausible alternative causes of the illness and the experts
why their conclusions refail to explain
32
valid.
main
3. "Narrow Admissibility"
Approach
The third group of decisions, like the
second, requires the expert to "rule in" the
defendant's product. The "narrow admissibility" approach, however, does not consider reliance on temporality or anecdotal
evidence to be a valid method of doing so.
Rather, these cases demand "hard science"
on the issue of general causation, such as
published and peer-reviewed scientific
studies establishing a statistically significant link between the substance and the
disease.
The Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in
Moore v. Ashland Chemical Inc. provides
a good example. 33 The court affirmed the
district judge's exclusion of medical testimony based on differential diagnosis, a
temporal relationship and the manufacturer's material safety data sheet containing generalized statements about the
potentially harmful effects of its chemical.
Although the majority referred only to the
physician's "examination and test results,"
the dissent makes clear that the doctor performed a differential diagnosis. The doctor

and can cause the very symptoms displayed by Dr.
Kannankeril." No. 96-5818, slip op. at 12 n.8 (3d
Cir. Oct. 17, 1997). The court cited no authority for
its proposition. In the amended version, the court
deleted this sentence and referred to a letter written
by one of the experts summarizing various reports
on organophoshates generally, but none on chlorpyrifos specifically.
32. Kannankeril, 128 F.3d at 808. This presumption seems unjustifiably to shift the burden of proof
to the defendant.
33. 151 F. 3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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could not point to any reliable studies connecting the chemical to the plaintiff's injury at the relevant exposure level, however, and this lack of tested and peerreviewed literature constituted the fatal
flaw in his opinion.
B. Application of the Daubert
Framework
Experts can attempt to explain three distinct aspects of causation by providing differential diagnosis evidence (1) that the
defendant's product is capable of causing
the disease from which the plaintiff suffers, (2) that the product indeed caused
that disease in this plaintiff, and (3) that
other agents did not cause the plaintiff's
disease. The first aspect obviously implicates the element of general causation,
while the second and third concern specific
causation. Because each of these aspects
affects a different element of the causation
issue, the admissibility of differential diagnosis testimony as to each element deserves separate treatment.
1. General Causation
Testimony based on differential diagnosis is never admissible with regard to

34. Breast Implant, 11 F.Supp.2d at 1230.
35. Cavallo, 892 F.Supp. at 771.
36. Patricia E. Lin, Note, Opening the Gates to
Scientific Evidence in Toxic Exposure Cases: Medical Monitoring and Daubert, 17 REV. LITIG. 551,

575-80 (1998).
37. See Cavallo, 892 F.Supp. at 771 (although
physician was not toxicologist, he nonetheless must
apply principles and methods of toxicology to give
opinion on issue relating to that specialty).
38. See, e.g., Baker v. Dalkon Shield Claimants
Trust, 156 F.3d 248, 252-53 (1st Cir. 1998) (testimony reliable where physician not only performed
differential diagnosis but referred to scientific studies supporting his theory); Glaser v. Thompson
Med. Co., 32 F.3d 969, 975-78 (6th Cir. 1994)
(doctor had conducted differential diagnosis and
authored published studies relating to general causation); Lakie v. SmithKline Beecham, 965 F.Supp.
49, 55-57 (D. D.C. 1997) (admitting testimony
where doctors employed differential diagnosis and
consulted studies showing causal link between
chemical and closely related disease).

whether a certain substance can generally
cause the disease in question because it
fails to satisfy both the reliability and relevance requirements of Daubert.3 4 Taking
relevance first, differential diagnosis at
best addresses only the issue of specific
causation.35 It does not seek to establish
causal links between the remaining substances and the disease in the general
population, and it therefore does not fit the
general causation issue.
For this same reason, differential diagnosis does not satisfy Daubert's reliability
requirement. Differential diagnosis presumes, but does not itself establish, that
the substance in question is capable of producing the harmful effects. Presumption
and supposition simply do not satisfy the
rigors of the scientific method. Differential
diagnosis does not, of itself, "rule in" any
causal agent.
It fails, moreover, to satisfy the Daubert
factors in the general causation context: (1)
it has not been peer reviewed as a method
of establishing general causation; (2) no
publications exist describing it as such;
and (3) epidemiologists and toxicologists,
those scientists who study the causes of
disease, do not employ it as a methodology
of their disciplines. 6
This is not to say that physicians may
never testify on the issue of general causation. To do so, however, they must have
done something more than rule out other
potential causes. Rather, they must explain
how they were able to "rule in" the product
in question. Put differently, they must
point to some reliable evidence on general
causation, employing the principles and
methods of epidemiologists or toxicologists, before giving an opinion relating to
those fields. 37 Having consulted scientific
studies with the qualifications necessary to
explain the methodologies used and extrapolated the data to the instant case, physician experts may testify that the product
can cause the disease.38
Physicians must consult and rely on
"hard science" before offering opinions on
general causation. Because the "broad ad-
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missibility" approach allows a physician's
general causation testimony based solely
on differential diagnosis, that approach
does not faithfully apply the Daubert
framework. Instead of requiring scientifically valid methodologies relating to general causation-such as dose-response and
epidemiological and toxicological studies-"broad admissibility" permits experts
to opine based on assumption, thereby ignoring the purpose of Daubert's gatekeeping obligation.
The justification for the "broad admissibility" approach is the wide use of differential diagnosis in clinical medicine. The
response is found in Daubert, which acknowledges the "important differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom
and the quest for truth in the laboratory." 39
In medicine, physicians assume the most
likely causal agent of their patients' illnesses so as to prescribe treatment and relieve suffering. As the maxim goes, medicine is not an exact science; it often
proceeds by trial and error.
Law is not an exact science either, but it
has developed certain rules to help ensure that allegedly wronged persons receive compensation only from those who
wronged them. One of the oldest of these
rules is the requirement that the defendant's conduct actually caused the harm.
Courts primarily need expert evidence
demonstrating that the product is capable
of causing the harm. Courts should not expect more from experts than the level of
intellectual rigor found in the relevant
field. For purposes of general causation,
the relevant field is epidemiology or toxicology, not clinical medicine. Clinical
techniques like differential diagnosis do
not bear on general causation and are inadmissible as to that issue.
Similarly, to the extent it permits testimony on the issue of general causation, the
"middle ground" approach fails to apply
the Daubert framework faithfully. Permitting physician experts to "rule in" the
defendant's product based on nothing
more than a close temporal relationship
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and generalized allegations proves no
more valid than allowing them simply to
assume the product can cause the disease.
The conclusion still rests on conjecture.
Temporality and case studies may give rise
to a hypothesis regarding general causation, but they certainly do not provide
proof in support of that hypothesis.
The "narrow admissibility" approach,
which requires the physician expert to consult and extrapolate from scientific studies,
comes closest to the correct Daubert
analysis of this question.
2. Specific Causation
In contrast to its use as proof of general
causation, differential diagnosis is ordinarily admissible with regard to both aspects of specific causation. Concerning
what did not cause the plaintiff's injury,
differential diagnosis is both reliable and
relevant. After all, physicians use the technique as a way of ruling out potential
causes of symptoms. Differential diagnosis
also satisfies many of the Daubert factors
when used for this purpose: (1) it has been
peer reviewed and tested; (2) books have
been published explaining the process; and
(3) it enjoys general acceptance in the
medical community.
Finally, when proffered to rule out alternative causes, differential diagnosis fits a
disputed issue in the case. Plaintiffs must
be able to eliminate, or at least minimize,
the chance that other etiologic agents contributed to the injury in order to prove that
the defendant's product more likely than
not caused the disease.4"
Even though differential diagnosis satisfies Daubert when utilized to eliminate alternative causes, courts should scrutinize
physicians' testimony carefully for the potential to mislead and confuse. A jury can
easily misinterpret evidence regarding
39. 509 U.S. at 596-97 (1993). See also Breast
Implant, 11 F.Supp.2d at 1230 (recognizing distinction between causation in clinical sense and causation in legal sense).
40. Cavallo, 892 F.Supp. at 771.
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what did not cause an injury as evidence of
what did, especially when it comes from a
well-credentialed medical doctor. Courts
must satisfy themselves that juries understand the purpose for which such evidence
is proffered, and judges should consider
the appropriateness of limiting instructions
under Rule 105. If, however, the testimony
has such great potential to misdirect and
confuse that it cannot be cured by careful
instruction, it must be excluded under Rule
403.
In addition to its admissibility as to what
did not cause an injury, physicians' expert
testimony based on differential diagnosis
is admissible with regard to what did cause
such injury. Again, when used for this purpose, the process meets both the reliability
and relevance requirements of Daubert. A
medical opinion as to a plaintiff's disease
and its underlying etiology has relevance
to the question of liability. While plaintiffs
can produce hundreds of epidemiological
studies showing a statistically significant
correlation between the product and the
disease, they must also prove that the product caused the disease in the instant case.
Medical testimony is the best way to
meet this burden. Moreover, a specific
causation opinion based on differential diagnosis fits the data collected-histories,
examinations and observations relating to
the illness of one particular individual.
To show that differential diagnosis is reliable when tendered for this purpose
proves a bit trickier, primarily because of
the ease with which admissibility can be
confused with sufficiency. Looking at
Kumho Tire again, it becomes clear that
judges should hold a witness only to those
standards that typify the practice of the relevant field. For purposes of general causation, the relevant field is epidemiology or
toxicology. For purposes of specific causa41. See, e.g., Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers Inc., 22 F.Supp.2d 942, 96367 (E.D. Ark. 1998); Breast Implant, 11 F.Supp.2d
at 1229-30; Hall, 947 F.Supp. at 1413; Cavallo, 892
F.Supp. at 771-72.
42. Joiner, 118 S.Ct. at 519.

tion, however, the focus shifts to clinical
medicine because physicians, not toxicologists, treat individual patients. As part of
that treatment, the physician to some extent must determine what is causing the
patient's illness.
Here, differential diagnosis becomes reliable since it constitutes the standard diagnostic procedure by which physicians determine the appropriate disease and its
most likely underlying causes. For purposes of explaining the cause of an individual plaintiff's injury to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, differential
diagnosis remains valid science. Accordingly, it should be admissible for this purpose even when the physician fails to consult scientific studies that "rule in" the
defendant's product
The "narrow admissibility" approach
consequently seems to run afoul of Daubert in this regard by demanding that the
expert consult "hard science" before offering a causation opinion. The decisions
grouped in this category repeatedly refer to
the necessity of ruling in the suspected
cause and justifiably reject differential
diagnosis for this purpose.4' The courts'
uneasiness with clinical evidence, unsupported by "hard science," is understandable, especially in light of Joiner's suggestion that gatekeeping involves winnowing
out those opinions that require too great an
analytical leap. 42 As a result, these decisions exclude the physician's testimony as
unreliable.
Underlying the exclusions of physician
testimony in the "narrow admissibility"
cases, however, is the plaintiffs' complete
failure to provide any reliable expert testimony concerning general causation. In
Cavallo, for example, the plaintiff attempted to proffer the opinion of a toxicologist as well as her physician. The court
first excluded the toxicologist's testimony
on the issue of general causation because,
to the extent his theory had been tested in
the scientific literature, it failed. Hence,
the testimony was neither scientifically
valid nor admissible under Daubert. Only
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Although Daubert ostensibly dealt only
with the issue of admissibility, its fit requirement, as explained in Joiner, raises
questions concerning its significance on
the issue of sufficiency. The standard for
fit requires a sound conclusion, based on
scientifically valid procedures, that clearly
and directly speaks to a disputed issue in
the case. If the methodologies used by the
expert are not reliable, or if the conclusion
does not adequately flow from those methodologies, the court may exclude the testimony. As Joiner explained: "A court may
conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the
opinion proffered." ' This statement, while
directly addressing the admissibility of sci-

entific evidence, in actuality appears to be
a standard for determining whether the evidence is sufficient to meet the proffering
party's burden of proof.
The lower courts disagree as to whether
Daubert's gatekeeping obligation altered
the role judges play in determining sufficiency.15 The Second Circuit, for example,
concluded in In re Joint Eastern and
Southern DistrictAsbestos Litigation "that
Daubert did not alter the traditional sufficiency standard. 46 Noting that admissibility and sufficiency "necessitate different
inquiries and involve different stakes," the
court held that the standard for sufficiency
mirrors the standard for determining judgment as a matter of law. Thus, unlike the
probing inquiry that characterizes judges'
role as gatekeepers for purposes of admissibility, the appropriate standard for assessing sufficiency remains "whether a
reasonable trier of fact could find in favor
of the non-moving party. 4 7
The Sixth Circuit employed a different
approach in Conde v. Velsicol Chemical
Corp.,48 in which it affirmed summary
judgment for the defendant. Although the
plaintiffs contested the trial court's exclusion of their expert witnesses' testimony,
the court stated that the real issue was the
trial court's alternative determination that
the expert testimony was insufficient to
prove causation. The court then engaged in
a Daubert-like analysis, finding various
flaws in their methodologies and noting
that the epidemiological studies on the
subject found little evidence linking the
supposed cause to the injury in question.
Accordingly, their conclusions did not reliably flow from the data collected, and the
trial court was right in finding the evidence
49
insufficient on the issue of causation.

43. 892 F.Supp. at 774-75.
44. 118 S.Ct at 519. Indeed, Joiner cited as authority the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Turpin v.
Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992), a
case dealing with sufficiency rather than admissibility.
45. See generally Capra, supra note 19, at 75155 (discussing Daubert and the sufficiency inquiry).

46. 52 F.3d 1124, 1133 (2d Cir. 1995).
47. Capra, supra note 19, at 752.
48. 24 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1994).
49. See also Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., v.
Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 713 (Tex. 1997) (applying Daubert factors to sufficiency inquiry and stating that U.S. Supreme Court would agree that determination of scientific reliability is appropriate in
reviewing legal sufficiency).

after excluding this general causation evidence did the court fault the physician's
testimony as incapable of ruling in the
defendant's product.
Had the toxicologist produced reliable
general causation evidence, however, the
court likely would have allowed the doctor
to testify. The court's decision to exclude
the differential diagnosis testimony, as
well as its subsequent decision to grant the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, had more to do with the sufficiency
plaintiff's
of that testimony to carry the
43
case than with its admissibility.
In the end, differential diagnosis evidence is admissible under Daubert when
offered to establish specific causation, but
a plaintiff still may lose the case on summary judgment because differential diagnosis is not sufficient to meet the burden
of proof.
DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS AND
SUFFICIENCY
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The debate over Daubert's application
to the sufficiency inquiry is, according to
one commentator, "more apparent than
real ...because admissibility and sufficiency often go hand in hand, especially in
toxic tort cases, where exclusion of an expert on admissibility grounds is usually
tantamount to a dismissal on insufficiency
grounds."5 That is certainly true of the
"narrow admissibility" decisions described
above, many of which excluded differential diagnosis evidence because the conclusion that the defendant's product caused
the plaintiff's injury required too great an
analytical leap in the absence of reliable
general causation evidence. Put differently,
the evidence did not fit the data.
While Daubert clearly allows a court to
make this type of ruling under the rubric of
admissibility, the real issue in these situations is the plaintiff's ability to satisfy the
burden of production. Therefore, under either the Second Circuit's traditional approach to sufficiency or the Sixth Circuit's
heightened analysis, differential diagnosis
is never sufficient to send the case to the
jury. Differential diagnosis has only limited admissibility; it can be used only to
establish specific causation.
Differential diagnosis never satisfies
Daubert so as to be admissible on the issue
of general causation. When plaintiffs cannot offer any scientifically valid evidence
concerning a product's general ability to
cause the injury in question, they fail to
make out a prima facie case, and summary
judgment is warranted even if plaintiffs offer admissible medical testimony concerning specific causation.
Hence, the "narrow admissibility" decisions confuse the issues, but they ultimately reach the right result-summary
disposition based on a failure to produce
reliable proof that the product can cause
the disease.

50. Capra, supra note 19, at 754.

CONCLUSION
Daubert dramatically changed the system for testing the admissibility of scientific evidence. As a result, it changed the
way in which toxic and mass tort cases are
litigated. Because plaintiffs must have expert testimony concerning both general
and specific causation, the admissibility
and sufficiency of that testimony becomes
crucial. A decision that the expert testimony does not meet the standards for reliability or fit renders plaintiffs incapable of
proving all the elements of their claims.
Likewise, even when courts admit expert
testimony, plaintiffs lose if the evidence
does not suffice to prove that the defendant's product more likely then not caused
the injuries.
One of the sources of expert testimony
frequently used to establish causation in
mass and toxic tort cases is the medical
process known as differential diagnosis.
Because this technique collects data relating to a particular patient, it is never admissible under Daubert with regard to general causation. Not only does differential
diagnosis, by focusing on individuals, not
fit the issue of general causation, it also
fails Daubert's reliability prong by assuming, rather than proving, that the supposed
cause actually produces the disease in
question. Accordingly, courts that adhere
to the "broad admissibility" approach,
which allows expert medical testimony as
to either level of causation, do not faithfully fulfill their gatekeeping obligation.
The "middle ground" approach, which
permits a physician to "rule in" the suspected product based on temporality or anecdotal evidence, similarly falls short. Epidemiology and toxicology constitute the
relevant scientific fields when proving
general causation, and a medical doctor
must employ the methodologies of those
disciplines to opine on the general causation issue.
The "narrow admissibility" approach
comes closest to the appropriate analysis
under Daubert by demanding that the physician consult "hard science" in the form
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of tested studies. But this approach over- sion of evidence that should be admissible
looks the distinction between general and when the two inquiries are theoretically
specific causation. Because clinical medi- separated, but that requires the fact finder
cine constitutes the relevant field of study to engage in too much speculation or conas to the latter, testimony based on a prop- jecture. Differential diagnosis falls into
erly performed differential diagnosis satis- this description.
fies Daubert with regard to specific causaCourts should allow physician expert
tion. The physician should be allowed to testimony based on differential diagnosis
give an opinion concerning what did cause but unsupported by "hard science" when
proffered to establish specific causation.
the illness as well as what did not.
Courts should examine such testimony But if plaintiffs cannot independently demcarefully under Rule 403, however, to onstrate general causation by scientific
make sure that it does not mislead or con- studies, then they fail to make out a prima
fuse the jury. In the end, though, differen- facie case, and summary judgment should
tial diagnosis evidence generally remains be granted to defendants.
admissible on the issue of specific causaUntil the Supreme Court concedes that
tion, and to the extent that it excludes dif- Daubert affects sufficiency review, howferential diagnosis in this context, the "nar- ever, lower courts will likely continue to
row admissibility" approach reaches confuse that inquiry with the assessment of
admissibility. Of course, that concession
further than it should.
Although Daubert seems to provide for necessarily implicates substantive tort
such a result by allowing the district courts policy, an area governed by state law.
to conclude that the analytical gap between Such a concession therefore would involve
the data and the ultimate opinion is simply Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,5 begging
too great, the Supreme Court would have the question whether Daubert remains
done better to classify this as an assess- valid in light of that decision's federalism
ment of sufficiency rather than admissi- concerns.
bility. Indeed, the Court itself lifted that
standard from a lower court decision addressing sufficiency. Moreover, the application of Daubert often leads to the exclu51. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

